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Human Stem Cell Research: NIH Releases Draft Guidelines for Comment
In December 1998, two groups of scientists announced that they had successfully isolated and cultured human
pluripotent stem cells. This news was
greeted with both tremendous enthusiasm and concern. Because these cells
can develop into most types of cells or
tissues in the human body, they hold
great promise for scientific research
and medical advances. For example,
stem cells can potentially be used to:

normal events which cause conditions such as birth defects and
cancer; and
• Substantially change the development and testing of drugs.
New medications could be tested
initially on stem cells, and only
drugs which were safe and effective on the cells would be tested
further on laboratory animals
and humans.

• Generate cells and tissues for
transplantation and therapy for
conditions such as Parkinson's
disease, spinal cord injury, stroke,
burns, heart disease, diabetes,
and arthritis;
- Improve scientists' understanding of the complex events
that occur during normal human
development, as well as the ab-

At the same time, the advent of
laboratory-ready human pluripotent
stem cells provokes pressing legal and
ethical concerns. The derivation of
stem cells from human embryos and
fetal tissue raises legal issues in light of
the federal ban on human embryo research and federal regulations on fetal
tissue research. There is also considerable ethical disagreement on the appro-
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priate level of respect for human embryos and fetal tissue as sources of stem
cells. Finally, some fear that stem cell
research sits at the brink of a slippery
slope that may lead to human cloning
practices.
In January 1999, the General
Counsel of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) determined that federal law does not prohibit public funding of pluripotent stem
cell research. Although federal law
bans HHS' funding of research in
which human embryos are created for
research purposes or are destroyed or
subjected to greater than minimal risk
(PL. 105-277, section 511,112 STAT.
2681-386), the ban does not apply to
research with stem cells obtained from
human embryos. The legal opinion
also specified that stem cells derived
from fetal tissue can be used for re-
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search, but since these stem cells fall
within the legal definition of human
fetal tissue, the research must comply
with federal regulations on fetal tissue
research (42 U.S.C. 289g-2(a), 45 CFR
§ 46.210, 42 U.S.C. 289g-1).
Following HHS' legal clearance,
the NIH Director, Harold Varmus,
convened a 13-member working group
to draw up guidelines for the proper
conduct of research involving human
pluripotent stem cells. The group comprises representatives from a broad
range of interest groups, including scientists, ethicists, lawyers, clinicians,
patients and patient advocates. The
working group held a public meeting
in April 1999 to discuss the guidelines
and hear commentary from various
parties, including the American Society of Cell Biology, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Alliance for
Aging Research, House Pro-Life Caucus, and National Bioethics Advisory
Commission.
On December 2, 1999, the NIH
released the working group's draft of
the Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research Guidelines. 64 Fed. Reg. 67576
(December 1999). The NIH has solicited feedback on the draft guidelines
and recently extended the comment
period until February 22, 2000. Thousands of comments had been submitted as of mid-January. The working
group will carefully consider the comments and make revisions to the guidelines. Until the final guidelines are
adopted, all publicly-funded research
involving pluripotent stem cells is on
hold. An NIH official has indicated
that the final guidelines would probably not be ready until early summer.
The draft guidelines
The draft guidelines cover any applications or proposals for federal research funding involving human pluripotent stem cells. See generally Fact
Sheet on Human Pluripotent Stem Cell
Research Guidelines (Dec. 1, 1999)
<http://www.nih.gov/ news/stemcell/
factsheet.html>. The guidelines do not

apply to privately funded research on
human pluripotent stem cells, though
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) strongly encourages
private researchers to voluntarily comply with similar guidelines.
According to the guidelines, scientific investigators must demonstrate the
following to qualify for federal funds:
-If the stem cells originate from
human embryos, the embryos
must have been excess embryos
created for the purposes of infertility treatment, not expressly
for research. The investigator
must not be involved in the infertility treatment, play any role
in the donor's decision to donate
the embryos, or offer monetary
or any other incentive to donate
the embryos.
-If the human pluripotent stem
cells originate from fetal tissue,
the research must be in compliance with all laws and regulations
governing human fetal tissue research and the fetal tissue transplantation research statute.
-Excess embryos and fetal tissue
must be obtained with the
donor's informed consent. Several requirements for informed
consent are specified, including
provisions that donors will not
receive any information regarding the subsequent testing on the
fetal tissue or cells, that all identifiers will be removed from the
cells, and that donors will not
receive any financial reward from
the research on the cells.
To ensure compliance and monitor the development of research practices, the guidelines establish the Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Review
Group (HPSCRG or "Review
Group"). The Review Group would
conduct an additional review of any
research proposal involving pluripotent stem cells after the proposal has
been approved by an institutional review board and NIH peer review

group. If a proposal involves a newlyderived line of stem cells, the Review
Group would hold a public review
meeting. The Review Group would
also be responsible for assembling an
annual report on the number of proposals reviewed and the titles of all
awarded applications, supplements or
administrative approvals for the use of
existing funds and intramural projects.
Finally, the guidelines expressly
forbid certain practices with federal
funds, including the creation of stem
cells expressly for research purposes
and the addition of stem cells to human or animal eggs or embryos via
somatic cell nuclear transfer. The prohibition on somatic cell nuclear transfer reflects concern that this technique
could be used for human cloning purposes.
Reaction to the guidelines
Response to these draft guidelines has
been mixed and vehement. The Patients' Coalition for Urgent Research
hails the guidelines as a step toward "a
new area of science with tremendous
promise for alleviating and even curing catastrophic illness," perhaps for
more than 100 million patients nationwide. Similarly, Rep. Nina Lowey (DNY) views this research as offering
Americans "the promise of better treatment and perhaps even cures for diseases like cancer, Parkinson's,
Alzheimer's and diabetes."
On the other hand, many members of Congress object to federal funding of stem cell research because the
cells originate from the death of a human embryo. Rep. Christopher Smith
(R-NJ), a leading opponent of stem cell
research, called the new guidelines "a
sham... [t]hey attempt to give a glow
of respectability to truly barbaric and
grotesque experiments on human beings." The National Right to Life Committee, like many anti-abortion groups,
argues that the guidelines "would result in federal sponsorship and funding of experiments in which living human embryos are dissected and killed
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- a clear violation of federal law.... "I
The scientific community has generally praised the draft guidelines.
University of California at San Francisco researcher Roger Pedersen calls
the guidelines "a positive thing, a very
thoughtful and thorough response" to
a delicate political situation. Some scientists advocate a less cumbersome system of regulation. For example, Paul
Berg, Ph.D., a Stanford University professor and Chair of the American Society of Cell Biology Public Policy
Committee, feels that federally-funded
investigators should not be held responsible for monitoring stem cell derivation procedures when private industry is the source of the cells. 2 Similarly,
the Federation of American Societies
for Experimental Biology (FASEB)
President David Kaufman, M.D.,
Ph.D., belives that independent certification of derivation and consent protocols by each investigator would cause
"an unnecessary duplication of effort."
Kaufman suggests instead the establishment of a certification process for stem
cell lines, with publication of the cell
lines that are acceptable for use. FASEB
also recommends that research using
stem cells derived before the publication of the draft guidelines should be
eligible for federal funding, even
though the currently available stem cell
lines do not meet the criteria set forth
in the draft guidelines.3
Recent and upcoming events
Stem cell research will soon enter the
political spotlight.4 On January 31,
2000, Senate Appropriations/HHS
Subcommittee Chair Arlen Specter (RPA) and Ranking Minority Member
Tom Harkin (D-IA) introduced Bill
S2015 which would allow for federal
funding of stem cell derivation as well
as research. (Under NIH draft guidelines, investigators cannot use federal
funds to derive the stem cells; instead,
they must obtain them from private
sources such as in-vitro fertilization
[IVF] clinics.) The Specter/Harkin
measure would also enable institutional

review boards to determine whether
stem cell research proposals conform
with NIH guidelines and would require
the HHS Secretary to submit an annual report to Congress on stem cell
research funded under the legislation.
Like the NIH guidelines, the bill prohibits the federally-funded creation of
human embryos or clones, and forbids
the transfer or acquisition of embryos
via monetary transactions. On February 22, the Subcommittee plans to hold
a hearing on stem cell research which
will include testimony from science and
disease research advocacy groups, as
well as celebrities Christopher Reeve
and Michael J. Fox. On March 8, the
subcommittee is scheduled to discuss
the President's FY 2001 budget for the
NIH March 8. In the House, expected
hearings on embryo or fetal research
issues include a Commerce/Health Subcommittee hearing on Representative
Tom Tancredo's (R-CO.) H. Res. 350,
a resolution to prevent the trafficking
of aborted fetal tissue and body parts
for profit and a Science Committee
hearing on cloning research.
Another important recent development was the February 1, 2000 announcement of the University of
Wisconsin's intent to distribute its line
of human pluripotent stem cells. University of Wisconsin researcher James
Thomson generated one of the two
current lines of stem cells with the
sponsorship of the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (WARF) and
Geron Corporation. Starting in late
spring, WiCell, a non-profit research
institute established by.WARF, plans to
distribute the stem cells developed by
Thomson. According to WiCell, scientists interested in obtaining the cells
would submit a confidential summary
of research plans to WiCell which
would review the plans for appropriate use and adequate respect for the
stem cells (e.g., cloning research would
be prohibited). Academic researchers
would be able to obtain two vials of
the stem cells for $500, though if researchers subsequently wished to commercialize any of their findings, they

would have to negotiate with WiCell
and potentially Geron. Industry researchers, on the other hand, would
have to pay significant up-front fees for
the cells and provide royalties to WiCell
and/or Geron for any revenue realized
from the cells. WiCell's plan has been
praised by scientists as "an excellent
idea to share these cells."'
The next few months will be an
important and interesting time for human pluripotent stem cell research.
Many events, including the promulgation of the final NIH guidelines and
developments in Congress, are likely
to have a pivotal role in determining
the course of regulation for this crucial area of scientific research.
Susan Lee
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ERISA and RICO: New
Tools for HMO
Litigators
Fiduciary duty under ERISA
As the shield preempting state suits
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) has been
successfully pierced (see CaliforniaDiv.
Of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr.N.A. Inc., 519 U.S.
316 (1997) and Duke v. U.S.
Healthcare,Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir.
1995)), plaintiff attorneys have begun
to use the ERISA statute itself to fur-
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ther litigation against managed care
organizations. The court in Shea v.
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997),
held in a landmark decision that an

HMO's failure to disclose financial incentives that discourage a treating physician from providing essential health
care referrals for conditions covered
under the plan benefit structure is a
breach of ERISAs fiduciary duties. The
pertinent ERISA provision requires
that plan fiduciaries "discharge [their]
duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." See 29 U.S.C. 5 1104(a)(1)
(1999). In Shea, the primary care physician, disregarding Mr. Shea's extensive family history of heart disease and
classic symptoms of a heart condition,
assured the patient that it was not necessary for him to see a cardiologist.
Subsequent to his death from a heart
attack a few months later, Mr. Shea's
wife successfully argued that had her
husband known that the primary care
physician would be penalized for too
many specialist referrals or receive a
bonus for reducing specialized care, he
would have disregarded his physician's
advice and obtained a cardiologist's
advice at his own expense. The court
therefore found it imperative to impose
a duty upon the HMO to disclose financial arrangements between managed care organizations and their contracting physicians.

Questioning the duty to disclose
financial incentives
The court in Weiss v. CIGNA
Healthcare, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 748
(S.D.N.Y 1997), declined to follow the

Shea approach, holding that the
physician's ethical breach in taking
advantage of financial incentives by
withholding necessary care is not attributable to the health plan. Alternatively, the court in Ehlmann v. Kaiser
FoundationHealth Plan of Texas, 198
F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000) did not explicitly rebut Shea, but instead refined
it. Ehlmann held that without a specific inquiry by a plan beneficiary, or

some other special circumstance, a
health plan has no duty to disclose
material information about physician
compensation arrangements. Unlike
Mr. Shea's specific inquiry into seeing
a cardiologist, Mr. Ehlmann sought an
injunction requiring a general disclosure to all plan members regarding the
bonus arrangement between the
HMOs and their contracting physicians. The Ehlmann court declined to
decide whether ERISA imposed such
a fiduciary duty of material disclosure
at all, but they did indicate in dicta
where they might stand on the issue.
Invoking the canon of statutory construction that the specific language in
a statute rules the general, the court
pointed out that while no reference is
made to any disclosure duty for physician reimbursement plans, ERISA contains many other provisions detailing
HMOs' disclosure duties. See 29
U.S.C. SS 1021-1031. Although, as the
plaintiff argued, at the time Congress
drafted ERISA, the same incentives to
cut back on healthcare expenses were
not present, the court indicated that
expanding these disclosure duties
would exceed their judicial role. They
explained, "Congress and the Department of Labor are surely aware of these
changes and have chosen not to supplement ERISA's disclosure requirements." Id at 556.

The Supreme Court to decide if
the existence of a financial
incentive structure implies a
fiduciary duty under ERISA
After the denial of a petition for rehearing by the Seventh Circuit en banc
of Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362
(7th Cir. 1998) to review reversal of a
dismissed ERISA claim, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and oral arguments were scheduled for February
23, 2000. Herdrich held that financial
incentives for physicians to limit medical treatment could reach the level of a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
where the fiduciary trust between plan

beneficiaries and fiduciaries no longer
exists. This fiduciary trust would no
longer exist in a situation where "physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering
proper care to, plan beneficiaries for
the sole purpose of increasing their
bonuses." Id at 373. In this case, although Mrs. Herdrich's appendix was
noticeably inflamed, her physician put
off for eight days the necessary diagnostic procedure. During the delay her
appendix ruptured resulting in peritonitis. The court emphasizes that the
dual loyalties tolerated under ERISA
do not extend to such situations where
a plan fiduciary "jettisons his responsibility to the physical well-being of
beneficiaries in favor of 'loyalty' to his
own financial interests." Id at 373.
The dissent in Herdrich argued
that the court's role in ensuring that
financial incentives offered by a health
plan to physicians were implemented
in compliance with the ERISA fiduciary
duties did not arise until the market
failed to align interests. Because employers have the bargaining power to
choose a different health plan if one
consistently fails to honor valid claims,
paying meritorious claims is in the
insurer's best interest, and no conflict
of interest thus exists. The dissent
would follow the rule laid down in
Shea to enable the market to function
by supplying the information employers need to evaluate their choice of
health plans, including disclosure of
any financial incentives to limit care.
The dissent from the denial of the rehearing en banc, joined by Chief Judge
Posner, expressed the view that the
majority's holding put all HMOs at risk
of being sued for breach of ERISA fiduciary duties "because the allegations
in the complaint narrate mundane features" of HMOs such as limiting referrals to specialists, using capitated fee
systems with bonus provisions, and
limiting the provision of care to specific locations. See Herdrichv. Pegram,
170 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 1999).
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RICO: The ability to bring
federal claims against insurance
companies tested
In Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 119 S.Ct.
710 (1999), a class of health insurance
co-payors alleged a violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) claiming that
Humana failed to disclose or pass on
discounts negotiated with providers so
that the Humana plan members paid
significantly more than the contracted
20% co-payment. See 18 U.S.C. 5
1964 (1984). To make a claim under
RICO, a statute originally designed to
allow prosecution of organized crime,
the plaintiff must show both conduct
of an "enterprise" through a pattern
of racketeering activity and injury to
the plaintiff, his business, or his property. Id. Forsyth claimed a pattern of
racketeering activity consisting of mail,
wire, radio, and television fraud and
damages resulting from paying a de
facto higher percentage of the co-payment than was bargained for. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that
RICO, which prohibits the same conduct as Nevada insurance law,but provides more extensive remedies including treble damages, does not "invalidate, impair or supersede" the state's
laws and so is not precluded under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See 15
U.S.C.A. 5 1012(b) (1997). After the
motion for summary judgment was
denied, this class action suit settled. If
the court approves the settlement, the
co-payor and premium class members
will receive $11,986,200 and
$4,113,800 respectively. See SE34 ALIABA 505, 522.
In another test of the use of RICO
against managed care plans, Maio v
Aetna Inc., 1999 WL 800315 (E.D.Pa.)
was filed alleging that Aetna's "advertising and marketing materials falsely
represent that it is committed to maintaining and improving quality of care
when in fact, Aetna failed to disclose
that its internal policies and agreements
with its providers are driven by fiscal
and administrative considerations that

reduce the quality of healthcare services." See SE34 ALI-ABA 505, 523524. This claim was dismissed with
prejudice for lack of standing because
the allegation that quality of care might
suffer in the future was too hypothetical to carry the burden of showing an
injury in fact. In a blow to the usefulness of RICO for future HMO litigation, the court went on in dicta to say
that other fatal defects were present in
the plaintiff's complaint. For example,
the court speculated that advertisements asserting commitment to quality of care could not constitute a
fraudulent inducement, but rather were
mere puffery. They also thought that
the plaintiffs failed to plead a sufficient
RICO "enterprise," and, furthermore,
should direct their dissatisfaction at
legislatures and regulatory agencies
rather than the courts.
Conclusion
At this point, ERISA is a more firmly
established means of bringing suit
against the managed care industry than
is RICO. However, the future of suits
brought under either statute is in limbo.
The Supreme Court's treatment of Pegram this term will resolve the conflicting lower court opinions and clear up
the fiduciary duties implicated by
ERISA in the administration of financial incentive structures. Upcoming dispositions of several recently filed RICO
complaints will more broadly illustrate
the treatment to be expected in the
future of RICO claims than the single
decision by one federal district court
judge thus far. In the meantime, the filing of claims against managed care
plans under both ERISA and RICO
continue. See Conte v. Aetna-U.S.
HealthcareInc., E.D. Pa., No. 99-CV4929, complaint filed 10/4/99, Pricev.
Humana Inc., S.D. Fla., No. 99-8763,
complaint filed 10/4/99, and O'Neil v.
Aetna Inc., S.D. Miss., No.
2:99CV284PG, complaint filed 10/7/
99.
Elaine T Moore

Legal Implications of
Discrimination in Medical Practice
Recent medical studies have indicated
that medical professionals discriminate
in their treatment practices on the basis of race and gender. Among the
many concerns stemming from this
realization are questions about the possibility of legal actions and the availability ofl individual compensation for
the denial of equal care. By meeting
legal evidentiary standards, 1 the recent
statistical data pointing to discriminatory trends have created the potential
for legal recourse through Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act2 which prohibits
recipients of federal funding from treating people differently on the basis of
race or national origin. Nevertheless,
it remains unclear whether patients
who have been treated unequally will
be able to use these studies as a basis
for successful legal action.
Over the past year, the New England Journal of Medicine has published several studies showing disparities in referrals and treatment of
women and minorities.3 The first, published in February 1999 and referred
to here as the Schulman study, initiated
the debate.4 Researchers videotaped
eight actors portraying various pairs of
paitents: male and female, AfricanAmerican and Caucasian, young and
old. The study varied six experimental factors among the 144 personalities it created for the videotapes: race,
sex, age, level of coronary risk, type of
chest pain, and the results of a stress
test. A total of 720 physicians each
viewed one of these 144 videotapes
and was asked to answer a number of
questions about how to treat the patient. The Schulman study indicated
that there were statistically significant
differences in the rate of referral for
cardiac catheterization between genders and races even after accounting
for any physiological differences between men and women and between
Caucasians and minorities. Despite
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articles questioning Schulman's statistical conclusions,' other recent studies
have indicated racial discrepancies in
access to renal transplantation,6 treatment of early-stage lung cancer, 7 and
success of treatment of left ventricular
dysfunction.' However, it is important
to note that the latter two studies were
explicit about not concluding why
these disparities occured. They noted
various factors which could cause such
differing results, even without any form
of physician discrimination. 9
An analysis of racial discrimination
illustrates the legal questions involved
in these cases. Patients who find they
have been discriminated against may
use these studies as evidence that minorities are treated differently by doctors, thereby creating a potential for
legal recourse. However, a private
plaintiff's recourse will likely only take
the form of prospective, injunctive or
declaratory relief. This means that a
court would order the institution to
undo the discrimination, if possible, or
refrain from discriminating against the
plaintiffs in the future. Title VI of the
Civil Rights Acts provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation
in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."10 The Office of
Civil Rights (OCR), located in the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for enforcing the
federal civil rights laws in hospitals,
clinics, social service centers and related
agencies." In the past, courts have held
that Medicare and Medicaid are "federal financial assistance" under the statute, and therefore hospitals and their
physicians must comply with the stat12
ute in order to keep their funding.
Moreover, the prohibition against discrimination applies to the hospital program as a whole, as a recipient of the
funding, not to the individual patient
beneficiaries of Medicare or Medicaid.
Any patient-whether or not a Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary-will

have a cause of action against a medical establishment that discriminates, as
long as the program 3 in which they
are involved does participate in Medi4
care or Medicaid.'
The Office of Civil Rights has promulgated regulations under Title VI
which outlaw both intentionally discriminatory acts as well as programs
and activities that have a racially disparate impact.'5 A recipient of federal
funds may not "utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color
or national origin, or have the effect
of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the
program as respect individuals of a
particular race, color, or national origin.' 6 Moreover, "[i]n administering
a program regarding which the recipient has previously discriminated
against persons on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, the recipient
must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination."' 7
In GuardiansAssociation v. Civil
Service Commission of New York" the
Supreme Court held that in order to
violate the Title VI statute itself a defendant must have intended to discriminate. However, a majority of justices stated that agency regulationspromulgated under Title VI may incorporate a lower, disparate-impact standard.
Therefore, discriminatory effect, without discriminatory intent is enough to
violate the regulations. Two years later
in Alexander v. Choate, a unanimous
Supreme Court explained the Guardians Association holding by saying that
"[i]n essence, then, we held that Title
VI had delegated to the agencies in the
first instance the complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts
upon minorities constituted sufficiently
significant social problems, and were
readily enough remediable, to warrant
altering the practices of the federal
grantees that had produced those impacts."' 9 Therefore the OCR regulations can rightfully prohibit disparate

impact discrimination.
Although it is clear that the statute and regulations cover intentional
and disparate impact cases, it is not
equally clear that private plaintiffs can
sue to enforce the OCR regulations.
The Office of Civil Rights itself can
bring enforcement actions requiring
medical centers to comply with their
regulations. However, in order for injured patients to sue there must be a
private right of action. In Guardians
Association, five justices endorsed without holding the existence of a private
right of action for discriminatory effects regulations cases. 20 This suggests
that injured plaintiffs may be able to
bring lawsuits if their medical institutions have unintentionally or intentionally discriminated against them. An
important question in the determination of whether the regulations imply
this right, is whether the Title VI statute itself implies a private right of action. If it does, then a regulation within
its scope will also imply a private right
of action.2 1 The Supreme Court in
GuardiansAssociation said that Title
VI itself gives rise to a right of action,
at least for claims for injunctive relief.
However, the Court has already established that regulations can be broader
than the Title VI statute itself, by covering disparate impact scenarios.
Therefore, the question remains
whether there is an implied right of
action for those parts of the regulations
not within Title VI's actual ambit. Both
the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have analyzed this question in
depth and have held that there is an
implied right of action for regulations
promulgated under Title VI, even
though these regulations, by reaching
disparate impact, are broader than the
statute itself.23 Therefore, the courts
at this point seem favorable to the possibility of injured patients suing to enforce the OCR regulations which proscribe disparate treatment in medical
facilities.
Even if patients will be able to establish discrimination suits under the
OCR regulations covering medical cen-
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ters, it is less clear what remedies will
be available to these plaintiffs. The
possibility of a compensatory damages
remedy for such a violation is questionable after GuardiansAssociation. The
Guardians Court made it clear that
compensatory relief is not available, at
least unless discriminatory intent has
been proven. 24 One explanation for
this limitation is derived from the fact
that Congressional authority to create
Title VI came from its Spending Clause
power. 2s When legislating through this
power, the government effectively proposes a contract with the states: if a
state accepts a specific form of federal
funding, it must follow certain regulations, like the prohibitions on discrimination. The Supreme Court in
26
PennhurstState School v. Halderman,
held that under Spending Clause statutes, courts cannot award relief other
than that contemplated by the statute;
otherwise they would be adding burdens to the states that were not there
27
at the time the contract was made.
Supreme Court precedent has established that the legislative history shows
that Congress did not intend to include
a damages remedy for non-intentional
violations.2" In addition, private plaintiffs can not sue to have an institution's
funding withdrawn for violation of the
statute. Only the overseeing federal
agency may act to withdraw the funding. Therefore, absent intentional violation, a plaintiff's remedies may only
be prospective relief, such as an injunction requiring compliance with the statute and regulations.
In considering these issues, it is
critical to distinguish between intentional discrimination and unintentional
discriminatory effects: at what point
does a discriminatory practice become
intentional? Given these recent studies, the medical community will have
a more difficult time in the future arguing that they were not aware that
such violations were occurring. For
example, these recent studies may not
be evidence that individual doctors are
intentionally treating minorities and
women differently, but they can still be

used to show that medical institutions
were aware of the problem. That may
be sufficient to prove intentionality if
nothing is done to correct the practice.
A deliberate indifference standard of
intentionality has been accepted in parallel Title IX 21 cases where the Supreme
Court has held that knowledge of
sexual harassment can be violative of
Title IX if the harassment is not corrected.30 Moreover, the OCR regulations themselves seem to prohibit deliberate indifference, 31 suggesting that
such behavior may be sufficient to support an intentional discrimination
claim. This interpretation is favorable
to plaintiffs since the Supreme Court
has suggested that compensatory damages may be available in those circumstances.
Over the past decade, our country has focused on tackling the issues
of gender and race discrimination both
legally and culturally. The recent studies above have brought significant media and congressional attention to this
highly relevant strand of the issue: discrimination in health care.3" Whether
or not most of these occurrences are
blatantly intentional, that inquiry seems
irrelevant to anyone who has been injured by these practices. So long as
relief is only prospective, the legal machinery will not likely cause a social
reconstruction: plaintiffs will have little
incentive to bring the legal action
which would undoubtedly force medical institutions to face this problem
head on. An injunction preventing future discrimination is little consolation
to a patient was not referred for cardiac catheterization in time, or was not
informed about renal transplantation
options. Whether discrepancies exist
because physicians tend to have different non-scientific expectations for
women and minorities, or because
communication between people is affected by race and gender,33 or for some
presently undiscovered reason, suboptimal health care without physiological basis is not acceptable. Further
study into the reasons for inconsistent
handling of medical situations is nec-

essary to provide mechanisms for improving health care quality.34 Medical
professionals must scrutinize their individual behavior to determine if and
when they are letting sociological biases and expectations invade hospital
rooms and dictate their patients' futures.
Jessamyn S. Berniker
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Wrongful Death: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Replaces Viability Standard with "Live Birth"
Standard
On December 7, 1999, a divided Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Nealis v.
Baird1 that a claim may be brought
under Oklahoma's wrongful death statute 2 on behalf of a nonviable fetus born
alive. The decision represents a departure from the traditional notion that
"viability"-the ability of a fetus to
sustain life outside the womb with or
without medical assistance-is the standard for wrongful death recovery. In
replacing the "viability" standard with
a "live birth" standard, the majority
maintained that live birth is the "unassailable point at which legal rights must
be said to attach to the human person."3 By holding a nonviable fetus a
legal "person" for the purpose of a
wrongful death claim, the court's decision emphasizes the limited application of the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Roe v. Wade4 that a
fetus is not a person for the purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Case history
Sheila Nealis had her first and only
appointment with Dr. Baird, an Oklahoma Board-certified family physician,
on August 28, 1991. Later that night,
she discharged fluid and blood. When
Mrs. Nealis returned to the clinic in
the morning, she was examined by Dr.
Hartwig who diagnosed her as threatening miscarriage and ordered an ultrasound. The ultrasound showed no
abnormalities. Mrs. Nealis continued
to bleed and experience intermittent
cramping but did not return to the
clinic. One month later, Mrs. Nealis
presented herself to the Perry Memorial Hospital (PMH) emergency room
where she was seen by Dr. Hartwig,
who again diagnosed her condition as
threatening miscarriage. Another ultrasound indicated a possible placen-

tal abruption. After Mrs. Nealis missed
two follow-up appointments, Drs.
Hartwig and Baird sent her a certified
letter discharging her from their care.
On November 25, Mrs. Nealis was
treated for premature labor by Dr.
Knecht, the on-call physician in the
PMH emergency room. A third ultrasound confirmed a placental abruption
and established the age of the fetus as
20-21 weeks. Dr. Knecht then prescribed Demerol to induce labor, despite its effect of suppressing respiration in newborns. At birth, although
nurses testified to gasping noises, measurements of the baby's functions were
zero and Dr. Knecht recorded a still
birth.
Mr. and Mrs. Nealis pressed two
claims in a medical malpractice action.
First, they sought damages for personal
injuries resulting from the prenatal care
provided to Mrs. Nealis by Drs. Baird
and Hartwig. Second, they sought recovery from Drs. Baird, Hartwig and
Knecht for the wrongful death of their
prematurely born child. The jury
found for the defendants on both
claims and the appellate court affirmed.
Nealis v. Baird
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court
affirmed the jury verdict exonerating
Drs. Baird and Hartwig on the first
claim and Dr. Knecht on the second
claim, it reversed the judgment exonerating Drs. Baird and Hartwig on the
second, wrongful death claim. The
court's reversal rested on an erroneous jury instruction that the fetus must
have been viable at the time of birth
for liability to attach.
Oklahoma's wrongful death statute applies to a "person" who could
have brought actions for personal injury "had he lived." In interpreting the
language of this statute, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court "reject(ed) the notion
that the distinction between biological
existence and personhood can extend
beyond live birth," holding instead that
"once live birth occurs, the debate over
whether the fetus is or is not a person
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ends."5 The court held that the phrase
"had he lived" could apply to a nonviable fetus because "Contemporary scientific precepts accept as a given that
6
human life begins at conception."
In Nealis, the defendant doctors
argued that taken together, Evans v.
Olson7 and Guyer v. Hugo Publishing
Co. 8 indicate no cause of action for the
wrongful death of a nonviable fetus
under any circumstances. In Evans, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
surviving child could bring a common
law personal injury action for prenatal
injury and, if the prenatal injury resulted in the death of a viable child in
the mother's womb, the child's representatives could bring an action under
the wrongful death statute. In Guyer,
the Court of Civil Appeals held that
Oklahoma did not recognize a wrongful death action for the loss of a nonviable stillborn fetus. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, however, disagreed
with the doctors, maintaining that
Evans and Guyer did not govern the
Nealis case since they both involved a
fetus not born alive.
At the same time, however, the
court found overbroad the Nealis' interpretation of its decision in Graham
v. Keuchel,9 which held that a wrongful death action in Oklahoma can be
predicated upon a prenatal injury that
occurs prior to viability. Mr. and Mrs.
Nealis urged that Graham removed
viability as a consideration in wrongful death actions if the decedent is born
alive at any time during gestation. The
court rejected this argument because
the question of the child's viability at
the time of its birth and death was not
an issue in Graham, as the child in that
case was born alive after a full-term
pregnancy. In Graham, the court simply denied the necessity of showing
viability at the time of the tortious act
causing the injury. Thus, Graham did
not answer the question of whether a
wrongful death action will lie for the
death of a nonviable fetus born alive.
In most jurisdictions, if a child is
stillborn but survived an injury in utero
to reach the point of viability, a wrong-

ful death action may be maintained.
However, where the child is born alive
prior to attaining viability, decisions
conflict about whether a wrongful
death action is similarly permissible.
The reasons courts have put forth
against permitting the action include
lack of precedent, difficulty of proof,
fear of fictitious claims, the necessity
of legislative action authorizing such
actions, and the traditional notion that
the fetus is not a person prior to viability. These reasons were rejected by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Nealis.
While the court conceded that "precedent is sketchy,"' 10 it discerned no
greater problem regarding matters of
proof or fictitious claims than exist in
any other tort case. Furthermore, the
court argued that the state legislature,
by tying the state's wrongful death statute to the common-law action for damages for personal injury, left the reach
of the wrongful death statute to the
growth of the common law.
Implications for abortions
The Oklahoma Supreme Court paid
special attention to the potential objection to their decision in Nealis based
on Roe v. Wade." After noting that
nothing in Roe prohibits the states from
affording legal protection to fetuses
born alive, the court argued that Roe's
conclusion that a fetus is not a person
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
does not require that it be considered
so for every other purpose: Roe v. Wade
and its progeny "proscribe(s) the state's
protection of the interests of the fetus
only when (they) conflict with the privacy-anchored constitutional right...
to an abortion.' 1 2 However, "Where
both the state and the mother have
identical interests in preserving the
child's life and in vindicating harm resulting in its death, Roe poses no legal
obstacle."13
Oklahoma statutes enacted to operate in the context of abortion '4 presume the viability of an unborn child
over 24 weeks old and mandate the

rendering of reasonable medical care
during the abortion of a viable child.
In Nealis, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court upheld the appellate court's decision that the statute does not apply
to a spontaneous miscarriage or natural, premature birth. Judge Opala
wrote, "The intent of the legislature in
enacting this statue was to criminalize
certain abortions and not to shift the
burden of producing evidence on the
issues of viability and the appropriate
standard of care in a wrongful action
arising out of spontaneous delivery.""
Instead of viewing the statutes as
setting up an equation between the
rights of an aborted infant and a naturally born infant, as Mr. and Mrs.
Nealis urged, the court perceived the
statutes as setting forth a comparison
in which the right to medical care of a
naturally born infant is used as the
baseline for the medical care afforded
to an aborted infant of similar status.
The court was not persuaded by the
argument that a rejection of their position gives an aborted child greater
access to medical care than to the
Nealis child because, according to the
ultrasound, he was less than 24 weeks
old, removing any requirement of
medical care under the abortion statute.
Dissent
Judges Hodges, Struhbar and Johnson
dissented from the majority's decision
to depart from the "viability" standard.
Writing for the dissent, Judge Hodges
argued that, despite a few contrary
decisions, there is general consensus
that a wrongful death action cannot be
maintained for the loss of a nonviable
fetus. He argued that the "live birth"
standard is based on an arbitrary distinction: whether a nonviable fetus dies
shortly before or shortly after a miscarriage. The "viability" standard, on
the other hand, merely recognizes that
a non-viable fetus cannot survive. Although it is possible for a nonviable
infant to show signs of life, such as
heartbeat, breathing and brain-wave,
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the nonviable infant "lacks sufficient
16
lung tissue to permit survival."
Furthermore, the dissent claimed
that maintaining the "viability" standard in wrongful death actions would
be consistent with the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals' adoption of "viability" as the standard to determine
which fetuses will be afforded protection under Oklahoma's homicide statute. "The determination of whether a
defendant wrongfully caused the death
of a fetus should be guided by the
threshold question of 'viability'
whether the cause is civil or criminal," 17
wrote Judge Hodges.

Conclusion
Since the United States Supreme Court
decision of Roe v. Wade, the line of viability for human fetuses has been consistently pushed back to earlier and
earlier gestational ages. Granting "person" status to a nonviable fetus, even
if only for purposes of the wrongful
death statute, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court did in Nealisv. Baird,represents an important expansion of fetal rights. Although the court explicitly limited its decision to nonviable
fetuses born alive, Judge Opala conceded that much of his opinion could
apply equally to stillborn fetuses. The
court's decision in Nealis raises important questions about the limits of a
nonviable fetus's rights under the law
and, consequently, the limits of tort liability, particularly for physicians.
Fatma Marouf

References
1. 1999 WL 1116790 (Okla.)
2. 12 Okla. Stat. 19915 1053. An
action for wrongful death permits the
decedent's personal representative (in this
case, his parents) to bring a lawsuit only if
the decedent had a right of recovery for
injuries at the time of his death.
3. Supra note 1, at 17.
4. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35
L.Ed. 2d, 147 (1973).
5. Supra note 1, at 9.
6. Id.
7. 1976 OK 64, 550 P 2d 924, over-

ruling Howell v. Rushing, 1953 OK 232,
261 P 2d 217 and Padillow v. Elrod, 1967
OK 18, P.2d 16.
8. 1991 OK CIV APP 121, 830 P.2d
1393.
9. 1993 OK 6, 847 P2d 342

10. Supra note 1, at 10.
11. Supra note 4.
12. Supra note 1, at 10
13. Id.
14. 63 O.S. 1991 S 1-732; 59 O.S.
1991 §5 524.
15. Supra note 1, at 15.
16. Bodkin, Delivery Room Decisions
for Tiny Infants; An Ethical Analysis, 1 J.
Clinical Ethics, 306, 307 (Winter 1990),
as quoted in Nealis v. Baird, supra note 1,
at 18.
17. Nealis v.Baird, supra note 1, at 18.

EMTALA: OIG/HCFA
Special Advisory Bulletin
Clarifies EMTALA,
American College of
Emergency Physicians
Criticizes It
In December 1998, the Office of Inspector General (GIG) and the Health
Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) solicited comments from
health care providers regarding the federal anti-patient dumping statute, the
Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA) (42 USCA
S1395 dd). EMTALA is a federal health
care law of unprecedented breadththe first universal benefit guaranteed
by the federal government. It requires
Medicare-participating hospitals with
public emergency rooms, emergency
physicians, and ancillary surgical and
medical specialists to render adequate
stabilizing treatment to whoever requests it. The 1998 Special Advisory
Bulletin (63 FR 67486-01) sought input on four principal dimensions of
EMTALA: (1) the statutory obligation
to furnish adequate medical screening
to anyone who visits an emergency
room; (2) the responsibilities of health
care providers towards enrollees of
managed care organizations (MCOs);
(3) the prior authorization and pay-

ment rules for Medicare and Medicaid; and (4) what practices would promote hospital compliance with
EMTALA.
Last November, OIG/HCFA published another Advisory Bulletin (64 FR
61353-01) which enumerated the salient issues raised by respondents to the
December 1998 Bulletin and clarified
how EMTALA is to be interpreted in
light of these concerns. The practical
effect of the latter Bulletin is to clarify
for hospitals how to comply with
EMTALA and thereby avoid the legal
remedies OIG/HCFA is empowered to
seek. These remedies include statutorily created penalties such as termination of Medicare provider agreements,
and civil money damages against both
hospitals and individual physicians.
Also in November 1999, the
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) released a timely task
force report, Defending America's
Safety Net (available at: <http://
www.acep.org/pdf/safetynet.pdf >).
The report argues that EMTALA has
compromised emergency care across
the nation by mandating that health
care providers render emergency treatment to whoever requests it, regardless of his or her ability to pay. ACEP
contends that the federal unfunded
mandate disproportionately affects
rural and inner-city hospitals because
they serve a higher proportion of nonpaying patients and tend to have less
robust operating budgets. Moreover,
ACEP claims that the demands of uncompensated care drive physicians to
restrict their availability and, hence,
attenuate the already limited resources
of many emergency rooms.

EMTALA Advisory Bulletin
Over 150 health care providers contributed to the OIG/HCFA request for
commentary on EMTALA. The subsequent November 1999 Advisory Bulletin addressed the respondents' most
prominent concerns: (1) voluntary
withdrawal; (2) inquiries from prospective patients about their ability to
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pay for emergency care; (3) dual staffing; (4) prior authorization; and (5) use
of financial responsibility forms. In
addition to delineating these concerns,
the Bulletin set forth guidelines to help
health care providers understand
EMTALA requirements.
Voluntary Withdrawal
According to the Bulletin, hospitals are
not permitted to keep patients waiting
so long that they elect to withdraw
voluntarily and forgo treatment. In the
event of a withdrawal, the hospital
ought to take the following steps: (1)
re-offer the treatment; (2) inform the
patient of the risks of leaving; or (3)
secure the patient's written informed
consent to refuse the treatment. Significantly, the burden rests with the
hospital to demonstrate that it has
taken appropriate measures to discourage patients from withdrawing.
Inquiriesfrom Patients
And what if patients inquire about financial liability prior to treatment? The
Bulletin advises hospitals to defer further discussions until after an appropriate medical screening. Several commentators to the December 1998 Bulletin suggested that this practice may
deter unscreened patients from remaining at the hospital because they will be
uncertain about what costs they may
incur. Nevertheless, the Bulletin maintains that hospitals ought to rebuff such
inquiries, placing greater weight on the
goals of screening and stabilization.
Disclosure of relevant financial information, however, is appropriate as long
as it does not interfere with expeditious
treatment.
Dual Staffing
An EMTALA-compliant practice has
arisen in which hospitals maintain a
secondary emergency room staff to
treat indigent, uninsured and underinsured patients. Though there is concern that this practice results in dispar-

ate standards of care, the Bulletin contends that there are insufficient data
to support this conclusion. As such,
dual staffing is not an EMTALA violation per se but may be conducive to
practices or occurrences that do violate the statute such as substandard
medical screening or unreasonably long
waits.
PriorAuthorization
A dilemma exists for hospitals: they
are required by law to accept contracts
with MCOs but may violate EMTALA
if they comply with the MCOs's prior
authorization rules. Generally speaking, these rules require MCOs to authorize all but the most routine procedures and absolve them of financial
responsibility if this authorization is not
secured. In worst case scenarios, patients and hospitals may bear the financial burdens of unauthorized but nevertheless medically justified emergency
care. Though EMTALA does not confer the authority on OIG/HCFA necessary to resolve this conflict perfectly,
the Bulletin emphasizes that a physician may contact an MCO for authorization once he or she has rendered
initial stabilizing treatment.
FinancialResponsibility Forms
Hospitals often present patients with
Advance Beneficiary Notices or similar documents, which explain that patients is liable for the costs of any uninsured treatment. The Bulletin endorses a "best practice" of deferring
presenting documents until after stabilizing treatment, lest prospective patients be discouraged from staying. Alternatively, it is permissible under
EMTALA to incorporate financial matters into a reasonable registration process so long as initial treatment is not
unduly delayed.
ACEP's Survey: Defending
America's Safety Net
Coinciding with the EMTALA Bulle-

tin, ACEP published an expansive survey of the financial health of the
nation's emergency care system, Defending America's Safety Net. The report focuses on the frontline providers of last resort who comprise the most
vital strands of what ACEP calls the
"safety net", and how that net has begun to fray under the weight of copious EMTALA requirements. Given the
number of uninsured Americans (estimated to be 43 million), compliance
with EMTALA often imposes nontrivial financial burdens on hospitals
and, ACEP argues, interferes with the
quality of emergency care for those
whom it is meant to serve. In dramatic
language, ACEP characterizes
EMTALA requirements as "a clear and
present danger to the integrity of the
nation's delivery system for emergency
medical care."
Unlike other federal health care
initiatives, EMTALA is an unfunded
mandate. As such, it is responsible for
a preponderance of the uncompensated care provided by physicians and
hospitals. In its report, ACEP estimates
that the direct and indirect costs of
compliance are at least $10 billion, and
may be as high as $27 billion. Since
emergency rooms are the main portal
of entry to the health care system for a
majority of persons without insurance,
a disproportion of these costs fall upon
rural and inner-city providers, where
most of these patients are found. As
the number of uninsured grows, the
requirements of EMTALA may further
jeopardize the financial viability of
these providers.
At the heart of the problem is
emergency department (ED) saturation
in many parts of the country. By this
ACEP means that many EDs are inundated regularly not only with more
patients than they can handle but also
with many patients who cannot pay.
These EDs try to cope by assigning their
physicians to back-up call panels that
can support the on-duty shift. EDs then
confront a difficult choice: either make
uncompensated coverage on these panels a condition of physician employ-
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ment or subsidize care from other budgetary sources.
ACEP recommends initiatives
across several frontiers. First, at the
local level, it urges hospitals to affiliate
themselves into cohesive networks to
share more evenly the costs of
EMTALA compliance. At the state
level, legislatures ought to provide at
least some of the resources needed to
defray the costs of uncompensated
care. Finally, given what it terms the
"health care stalemate in Washington",
ACEP is somewhat pessimistic about
what the federal government can do
to alleviate EMTALA pressures. As
such, ACEP advocates a long-term view
that emphasizes a gradual evolution
towards a regime in which emergency
care is accessible and appropriately
compensated. To achieve these goals,
ACEP encourages HCFA to experiment with creative alternatives to the
current EMTALA-oriented system. For
example, HCFA could oppose the
criminalization as fraud and corruption
the practice of using Medicare, Medicaid and similar public funds to crosssubsidize uncompensated care. Another possibility is for HCFA to require
MCOs to compensate physicians who
justifiably treat MCO patients, even if
proper prior authorization was not secured. Only through these sorts of
structural changes, ACEP believes, will
stability and universal accessibility be
achieved.
Conclusion
Though the Special Advisory Bulletin
clarifies how health care providers are
to comply with EMTALA, it leaves the
largest question unanswered: What are
the long-term financial implications of
an onerous and unfunded mandate?
The ACEP report contends that the
central aim of EMTALA-a minimal
universal health care benefit-is unattainable so long as providers teeter precipitously on bankruptcy. As in other
areas of health care, the crux of the
EMTALA debate is how to reconcile
the statute's expansive goals with the

meager resources available for their
realization.
Jeffrey Rowes

Disability & ADA: Disparate Insurance Coverage for Physical and
Psychological Disabilities
Does Not Violate ADA
In Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d
1092 (loth Cit. 1999), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a U.S. District Court's grant of
summary judgment against an
employee's claim that an employeroperated disability insurance plan,
which offered different levels of compensation for disabilities due to mental and physical conditions, violated
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1 The Court of Appeals
found that (1) the Thiokol plan
administrator's interpretations of the
plan were not arbitrary and capricious,
and that (2) the plan's different treatment of disabilities caused by physical
and mental conditions did not violate
the ADA.
The Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) is a general remedial statute
designed to combat discrimination
against persons with disabilities. 2 Both
private plaintiffs and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) may enforce the act.' Title I
of the ADA prohibits discrimination
against employees "because of their
disability" in the terms, conditions, and
4
privileges of their employment.
Defendant Thiokol administered
a disability benefits plan for its employees. The plan compensated employees for disabilities, with no cap on the
duration of benefits for a disability
caused by a physical condition. Compensation for mental disabilities was
limited to 24 months.
Plaintiff Ivan Kimber worked for
Defendant Thiokol as a heavy equipment operator from the 1970s until the
secondary effect of insulin dependent

diabetes caused him to be reassigned
as a clerk, and then to leave work. The
Thiokol disability insurance plan found
that he was totally disabled by visual,
circulatory, and other sequelae of his
diabetes. Kimber's continued disability was reviewed regularly by Thiokol's
benefits plan and John Hancock Co.,
Thiokol's external claim reviewer. In
1995, Kimber's continued disability
was questioned by John Hancock. His
benefits were terminated for failure to
provide documentation of a continuing disability. Kimber submitted a request for continued benefits supported
by evidence that he continued to be
disabled by depression and possible
psychosis associated with his physical
Thiokol reinstated
condition.
Kimber's disability payments, but classified his claim as based on a mental
disability, and imposed the 24 month
benefits cap.
Kimber brought suit to require the
continuation of benefits in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah.
He claimed that the decision to terminate was contrary to the terms of the
Thiokol disability plan, and that the
plan's difference in coverage for physical and mental disabilities violated the
ADA. The District Court granted defendant Thiokol's motion for summary
judgment. The 10t Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed de novo. Writing for

the

10

th

Circuit's unanimous three-

judge panel, Judge Paul Kelly evaluated
and rejected Kimber's claims under the
ADA and ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA').5
ERISA regulates the operation of
employee benefits plans to ensure the
compliance of the plan manager with
its own rules, and to ensure that employees receive the benefits to which
they are entitled. Kimber argued that
the process and decisions by which the
plan administrator reclassified and then
terminated his benefits violated the law.
The court rejected this claim. Benefits
plan administrators' determinations of
fact and interpretations of plan terms
are evaluated under a highly deferential standard-they will not be dis-
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turbed by a reviewing court unless arbitrary and capricious.' Kimber argued
that Thiokol's operation of its own selffunded plan created a conflict of interest, and that the court should therefore review the administrator's actions
with reduced deference. The court
rejected this contention, arguing that
there was no appreciable conflict of
interest because the plan was administered by a salaried employee, and that
disability benefits paid under the plan
only totaled 0.3% of Thiokol's annual
operating expenses.7 The court found
(1) that the administrator's reclassification of Kimber's disability was an
appropriate exercise of the plan's continuing review provisions,8 (2) that
documents supporting Kimber's claims
were properly reviewed by a managed
care plan contractor rather than the
plan administrator herself,9 and (3) that
the facts before the administrator could
support the conclusion that the disability was due in significant part to a mental illness. 10 The administrator's determination rested on her interpretation of language in the plan distinguishing between disabilities "due to" physical and mental illness." She read the
term as meaning "due, in at least significant part, to". Reviewing the
administrator's interpretation of the
plan, the court found that the phrase
"due to" was ambiguous, and that the
interpretation was a reasonable, and
therefore valid, interpretation of am12
biguous language.
The court then considered the
position of Kimber and, as amicus curiae, the EEOC, that providing disparate benefits for physical and mental
disabilities violates the ADA. Kimber
focused on the different benefits given
by the plan to workers with different
disabilities. Relying on decisions in
similar cases from the Third", Fourth14,
Sixth", Seventh' 6 , and Eighth' 7 Circuits, the court dismissed Kimber's argument. Rather than adopting
Kimber's stance that a court's focus
should be on the disparate ex-post
treatment of disabilities, the court focused on the neutral ex-ante opportu-

nity for plan participation offered to
employees. In other words, the court
held that instead of considering the
differences between compensation
paid to plan beneficiaries with different disabilities, the proper question is
whether any beneficiaries with protected disabilities were discriminated
against because of their disability by
being denied the same benefits other
plan members would receive for the
same disability.
Judge Kelley noted that "[w]hile
[Thiokol's disability plan differentiated
between types of disabilities, this is a
far cry from a specified employee facing differential treatment due to her
disability...."' The court held that
"[s]o long as every employee is offered
the same plan regardless of that
employee's contemporary or future
disability status, then no discrimination
has occurred ..."11Quoting the 7T h
circuit's decision in EEOC v. CNA Insurance, the court added that ".... the
ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities."z20
The court also noted the potential
financial implications of requiring insurance companies and employee-operated plans to provide benefits to persons with mental disabilities at the same
level they do for those with physical
disabilities. It echoed the Third
Circuit's finding in Ford v. ScheringPlough that if the ADA was held to require such treatment, it "...would destabilize the insurance industry in a
manner definitely not intended by
'
Congress when passing the ADA."'2
Finally, the court relied upon the
D.C. Circuit's ruling in Modderno v.
Gng22 that distinctions in benefits based
on physical and mental disabilities had
been valid under the ADA's predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act. Because of
the similar purposes and structures of
the two laws, Rehabilitation Act case
law is often used as a model for inter2
preting the ADA. 1
The Tenth Circuit's opinion was
handed down in the context of increased political activity surrounding

mental health and the mentally ill.
Activists in the area have focused both
on increasing the resources available to
mentally ill persons and their families,
and upon changing the public perception of mental illness. In the first Surgeon General's Report on Mental Illness, Dr. David Sacher notes that
"[Mental disorders] continue too frequently to be spoken of in whispers and
shame. Fortunately, leaders in the mental health field-fiercely dedicated advocates, scientists, government officials, and consumers-have been insistent that mental health "flow in the
mainstream of health. 21 4 HHS Secretary Donna Shalala has praised Tipper
Gore's work as Mental Health Advisor to the President in arguing that
"mental illnesses are just as real as other
illnesses ... "25
Had it adopted the position taken
by Kimber and the EEOC in this matter-that the ADA requires similar
treatment of physical and mental disabilities-the court would have would
have provided a powerful tool to equalize treatment for mental illness. It
would also have made a clear statement
of public policy that mental illness is
no less important than physical illness.
The rejection of this view by the Kimber
court and subsequently by the Ninth
Circuit in Weyer v. Twentieth Century
Fox,26 has forced advocates for equal
treatment to return to the legislative
and administrative arenas in their
search for relief.
Nicklas A. Akers
1. 42 U.S.C. S12101-12213 (Supp.II
1997)
2. 42 U.S.C. S12101(b) (Supp.II
1997) ("It is the purpose of this chapter:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with
disabilities .... )
3. 42 U.S.C. S12117 (Supp.II 1997)
4. 42 U.S.C. 5 12112(a) (Supp.II
1997)
5. 29 U.S.C. S 1001-1461 (Supp.II
1997)
6. CharterCanyon Treatment Ctr.v.
Pool Co., 153 F.3d 1132, 1135(10th
Cir.1998); Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1100.
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7. Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1098
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1099
1O.Id.
11. Id. at 1100.
12. Id.
13. Fordv.Schering-Plough Corp., 145
F.3d 601 (3 1dCir.1998), cert. den'd. 119
S.Ct. 608 (1999) (Title I does not require
equal treatment of mental and physical disability in employee operated plan, Title III,
relating to public accommodations, does

(Visited Feb. 21 2000) <http://
www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/home.html>
26. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp-, 198 F.3d 1104 (9 ,h Cir.2000)
(citing Kimber at 1116) (Neither employer
or insurance company prohibited by Title
I from offering different physical and mental disability benefits, Title III does not apply to insurance company.)

not apply to such plans.)

AIDS: Mississippi Supreme Court Adopts
New Standard for Fear of
Exposure to AIDS

14. Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F3d
166 (4 h Cir.1999) (Title I does not pro-

hibit employer or its insurance company
from offering different physical and mental disability coverage)
15. Parkerv.MetropolitanLife Ins. Co.,
121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
cert. denied 522 U.S. 1084 (1998) (Title I
does not prohibit employer or its insurance
company to offer equal benefits for physical and mental disability; Title III does not
apply to employer.)
16. EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d
1039 ( 7Th Cir.1996) (Insurance company
offering plan to its own employees not prohibited by Title I from offering different
benefits for physical and mental disability);
"Few, if any mental health advocates have
thought that the result they would like to
see had been there all along in the ADA."
Id. at 1044.
17. Krauelv.Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr.,
95 Fed.3d 674 (8'h Cir.1996) (Employer
health benefit plan may exclude funding
for infertility treatment under ADA Title I
and Title VII.)
18. Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101, quoting Ford, 145 F.3d at 608.
19. Id.
20. Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101, quoting EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039,
1044 (7 "hCir.1996)

21. Kimber 196 F.3d at 1102, quoting
Ford, 145 F.3d at 608
22. Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1102, quotingModderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1061
(D.C.Cir.1996) (Rehab. Act does not prohibit US Foreign Service Benefit Fund from
offering different health insurance benefit
for physical and mental illness.)
23. Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624,
631 (1998)
24. Dr. David Sacher, Preface, in MENA REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (1999), (Visited Feb. 21, 2000)
TAL HEALTH:

<http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/home.html>
25. Donna Shalala, Message from
DonnaE. Shalala,Secretary of Health and
Human Services, in, MENTAL HEALTH: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

(1999),

On November 4, 1999, in South Central Regional Medical Center v.
Pickering, 1999 WL 1000703 (1999),
the Mississippi Supreme Court created
a new legal standard that allows patients to recover damages for fear of
exposure to AIDS even though they
cannot prove actual exposure. By
adopting this standard, the Mississippi
Supreme Court joined the minority of
jurisdictions seeking to encourage providers to use reasonable care when handling instruments capable of transmitting disease.

ately disposed of the lancets in a proper
receptacle. When Pickering asked the
nurse why she had not disposed of the
lancets before then, the nurse allegedly
responded that the receptacle was
implemented only two weeks earlier
and that she was not yet accustomed
to using it.
Pickering further claimed that every time she had previously tested her
blood for sugar levels, she had been
employing used lancets. However,
Pickering was unable to offer any evidence that the lancets she used were
contaminated with HIV or any other
communicable diseases; the lancets
were disposed of by the hospital before they could be tested.
It is undisputed, however, that
South Central ordered Pickering to be
tested for HIV She was tested five times
between September, 1987 and September, 1988. Each time, the result of the
test was negative. After learning that
she was exposed to previously used lancets, Pickering allegedly became extremely anxious and afraid that she had
contracted HIV Pickering and her
husband brought suit for emotional
distress.

Factual background

Previous court rulings

Plaintiff Jimmie Pickering is a female
diabetic, who was receiving treatment
at South Central Regional Medical
Center (South Central) between September 30 and October 5, 1987 to
regulate her blood sugar levels.
Pickering used the hospital's Autoclix
machine, which required that Pickering
use lancets to prick her finger to draw
blood.
According to Pickering, the nurse
responsible for her treatment informed
her that the lancets with which she had
been pricking her fingers were previously used lancets. In one alleged incident, the nurse grabbed Pickering's
hand, effectively preventing her from
using a lancet. The nurse informed
Pickering that the group of lancets from
which she had chosen was a group of
previously used lancets and immedi-

The "actual exposure" requirement
was recently articulated in Mississippi
in Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v.
Ferguson, 662 So.2d (Miss. 1995). In
this 1995 decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that for a patient to
recover for emotional distress predicated on potential future illness, "there
must be substantial proof of exposure
and medical evidence that would indicate a possible future illness." Id. at 658.
In that case, the Fergusons brought suit
based on a fear of developing cancer
from dioxins released by a mill situated 100 miles away from their house.
The Ferguson's claim was rejected on
the grounds that they never tested the
water from their wells and property;
tests of dioxin levels in neighboring
areas that they presented was deemed
insufficient. The court held that "emo-
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tional stress based on the fear of a future illness must await a manifestation
of that illness or be supported by substantial exposure to the danger." Id. at

650.
A majority of jurisdictions side
with the Ferguson requirement of actual exposure when considering emotional distress claims based on a fear
of contracting AIDS. For example, in

Pendergeistv. Pendergrass,961 S.W2d
919 (1998), a patient sued a hospital
for allegedly giving him a human blood
factor instead of a synthetic blood factor which was known to be safer. The
Missouri court rejected the patient's
claim, because "he failed to offer any
evidence that the [human] blood product was contaminated with HIV or
hepatitis B." Id. at 926.
A minority of jurisdictions maintains that actual exposure is not a prerequisite to recovering damages. The
damage amount in these cases, however, is less then the amount in the actual exposure cases. Here, courts limit
the patients' recovery for emotional
distress to a "window of anxiety," defined as the period of time between
when a patient learns of possible exposure to HIV and when the patient
receives definitive HIV-negative results.
Faya v. Almara, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).

South Central Regional Medical
Center v. Pickering: A new
standard is adopted.
In Pickering's case, the Mississippi Supreme Court declined to use the actual exposure requirement to dismiss
her claim. Notably, the court explained that it did not abandon the
actual exposure requirement. The
court held that in actual exposure cases
a patient needs only to establish: (1)
that the hospital owed a duty to the
patient to protect her from exposure
to diseases; (2) that the hospital
breached that duty by "negligently allowing or causing a medically recognized instrument or channel of transmission to come into physical contact"
with the patient; (3) that the resulting

emotional injury was a "foreseeable
result of that breach"; and (4) that there
was, in fact, an emotional injury. In
such cases, where the hospital "allowed
or caused the best evidence to be destroyed," thereby denying the patient
an opportunity to test it, a rebuttable
presumption arises in favor of the patient in court. Thus, the hospital, not
the patient, carries the burden of proving that the instrument which came
into contact with the patient as a result of the hospital's negligence did not
carry a disease.
According to the court, the rebuttable presumption prevents the unjust
result of punishing the patient in court
for not being able to offer substantial
proof of exposure where the source of
that substantial proof has been destroyed by its source. This injustice
would not occur, the court noted, if
the hospital did not know or have reason to know that the evidence which
it discarded was in question and where
it was disposed of in the normal course
of a medical practice. In such cases,
then, the court held that the presumption does not arise.
Finally, the court decided that in
the absence of illness resulting from the
alleged exposure, as in this case, recovery is limited to compensation for emotional distress during the "window of
anxiety." For Pickering, the window
was the time period between when she
learned of her possible exposure and
when she received conclusive HIVnegative results.
Conclusion: Some policy concerns
The issue of whether a patient is required to prove actual exposure in recovery for fear of contracting AIDS is
a difficult one. Indeed, courts' attempts
to resolve the issue have triggered tumultuous public policy debates. The
majority of jurisdictions have continued to emphasize the importance of
requiring actual exposure in order to
ensure that a claim is bona fide, while
the minority has responded by arguing that the actual exposure rule does

not provide plaintiffs with compensation for legitimate grievances. 22 Am.
J. Trial Advoc. 495 (1998). With its
ruling, the Mississippi Supreme Court
supplied an additional justification
through its encouragement of hospitals to use reasonable care in handling
instruments capable of transmitting
disease and to conduct tests to determine whether such instruments are
contaminated in the event that they
came into contact with an individual.
According to the courts, the burden
should fall on the providers because
they are, in the end, the greater costavoider: "South Central was in the best
position to determine the capability of
the lancet to transmit the disease causing agents. A simple and relatively expeditious test of the lancet would most
likely have prevented the Pickerings
from developing any substantial or reasonable fears of contracting any communicable diseases."
Iris Lan

Organ Transplantation:
New Regulations to Alter
Distribution of Organs
On December 17, 1999, President
Clinton signed the Ticket to Work and
Work Incentives Improvement Act of
1999,1 which instituted a 90-day comment period for the amended Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network ("OPTN") Final Rule ("Final
Rule"), a comprehensive set of guidelines that would affect how organs are
2
allocated throughout the country.
Barring further legislative action, the
Final Rule, which has been over five
years in the making, will be effective
3
on March 16, 2000.
The Final Rule, issued by the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") pursuant to the National Organ Transplant Act, 4 was originally published April 2, 1998.s It provided a number of substantive changes
to the process through which organs
are allocated by the United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a private,
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non-profit organization charged with
administering the national organ transplantation network. 6 Following a oneyear moratorium to allow comments
and review, DHHS published an
amended version of the rule on October 20, 1999. This version incorporated suggestions made after an extensive review undertaken at Congress'
request by the National Academy of
Science's Institute of Medicine. The
rule was to go into effect on November 19, 1999, but was again stayed to
allow further examination as well as
scientific and medical input.
The cautious approach to the Final Rule is understandable, as it seeks
to adjust a delicate national system of
organ allocation initiated in the 1970s.
While organ transplantation has become "an established medical procedure," with over 20,000 transplants
performed annually in 278 transplantation centers,7 the way in which organs should be allocated remains controversial. The debate over the Final
Rule reflects the ideological and practical divide between DHHS and UNOS
concerning the procedure and criteria
for allocating organs, as well as the
procedure for reviewing the organ allocation system. 8 The root of their disagreement appears to be how to deal
with scarcity. With only approximately
10,000 organ donors each year for
over 60,000 patients in need, policy
decisions determining who receives the
limited number of organs carry crucial
consequences.'
Under the current system, UNOS
implemented guidelines where "patients are given priority for organs
based first on their geographic location
instead of their medical need." 10 Once
an organ becomes available, the system looks within the local geographical confine, allocating the organ to the
patient who has the greatest medical
need. This organ will normally be sent
to other regions only if no one in the
original locale can accept it. This system reflects the current medical reality: organs remain viable only for a limited amount of time prior to the trans-

plantation. Thus, it is not generally
considered feasible to transport an organ great distances." With the improvement of medical technology,
these "cold ischemic times" (i.e., when
the organ is en route) have been extended; still, neither DHHS nor UNOS
maintain that organs currently remain
viable for enough time to establish a
true "national" list. However, despite
the impracticality of a national list,
some do criticize the system for adhering to the "local first" allocation policy,
reasoning that the "geographic areas"
could be broadened. If the size of the
region is increased, they argue, those
patients in greater need could receive
organs without necessarily jeopardiz2
ing the organ's viability.
Another criticism of the current
system is the alleged lack of uniform
criteria for "deciding when to list patients for transplantation and for identifying patients' medical urgency status."' 3 Insofar as "waiting time" is used
as a criterion, and to the extent that an
arbitrarily-defined "medical need" allows one patient to pass another on
the list, DHHS argues that the system
needs a common set of classifications
for doctors in diverse geographic areas. Otherwise, certain patients described by their doctors "as more medi14
cally urgent than they really are" will
be placed above others in equal or even
greater need. s
A third complaint is that the final
system lacks a strong, governing body
to ensure non-arbitrary decisions and
compliance with the rules. DHHS
claims that increased accountability
and review could better meet the public interest in providing for the fair,
equitable, and effective distribution of
organs to those patients most in need.'6
While there are other alleged systemic deficiencies, the perceived problems above were the primary focal
points of public scrutiny, and the main
areas where the Final Rule came under attack. Relying in part on the Institute of Medicine's study, DHHS
amended the original rule to address
these shortcomings. The Final Rule

requires UNOS "to develop standardized criteria for listing patients and
defining their medical urgency status,"
attempting to eliminate perceived differences in treatment based on geographic disparities. 7 This enables
UNOS, relying on the extensive and
diverse backgrounds and experiences
of its members, to determine the medical and ethical guidelines for minimizing the role of geography." The Final
Rule also mandates that organs be provided first to those patients with the
greatest need, given the ischemic restraints as well as other medical considerations such as favoring healthier
patients over those who may be too ill
to benefit from the transplantation.' 9
Finally, interalia, the Final Rule establishes "an independent scientific review
board" to aid the DHHS Secretary in
evaluating, overseeing, and enforcing
the organ allocation policies under the
rule and as formulated by UNOS.
While there is the expected consensus that the system should be fair
and effective, disagreement appears
when deciding how to make the system fair and effective. UNOS and
many transplant practitioners fear the
proposed rule, while well-intentioned,
will be ineffective, and furthermore,
may even cause harm. One concern is
that increasing the geographic areas
over which organs are distributed
would unduly favor large transplant
centers; if so, this trend could eventually force smaller and medium-sized
centers to close. UNOS worries that if
transplant centers close, people, lacking the visible reminder of the local
transplant center, will be less likely to
donate organs, which will further exacerbate the existing organ shortage.20
On a similar note, UNOS has argued
that a broader geographic list will lead
to longer waits for those patients previously in a smaller geographic area; if
organs are distributed nationally, and
one criteria for distribution is the length
of the wait, those centers with more
people (and thus most likely longer
waits) may command organs before the
smaller center patients get their turn.2'
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Critics of the plan also fear that its provisions will lead to the sickest patients
getting the organs, even if these organs
would be better or more efficiently
used in healthier persons with greater
chances of survival.22 Finally, some
worry that the regulation delegates too
much power to DHHS, dubiously
stripping the UNOS doctors and experts of the decision-making power
only doctors and experts should have.23
However, despite the earnest hesitation, many of these fears appear unfounded. The Final Rule grants broad
latitude to UNOS in developing the
medical standards to implement the
rule's more general goals. Where a
strict interpretation of the rule would
violate the clear intent of saving lives
with optimal efficiency, it can plausibly be assumed that the DHHS would
hear UNOS concerns and approve
them where appropriate. The Final
Rule in no way suggests that sound
medical practices should be abandoned
for the sake of any "bright line" test
erroneously read into the rule. Also,
extending the geographic regions is
merely an attempt to get organs to
those most in need, instead of those
closest to the donor (when and where
medically appropriate and feasible, as
determined by UNOS). As well as providing a more equitable distribution,
this should allow smaller centers with
fewer donors to benefit, receiving organs from other regions for critical
cases that would otherwise be used by
less urgent patients in the locale where
the organ was donated. On a similar
note, if organs are allocated beyond the
region where they are procured, a local region need not produce as many
donors to ensure its patients are served.
This may benefit those regions where
health and safety regulations lead to
fewer deaths in which organ donation
is possible.
Given the dissonance, it appears
that the rift will continue until many
of these notions are tested and evaluated using real empirical data. However, compromise is possible: the original Final Rule was amended, and, in

recent months, UNOS has adopted
"larger" geographic areas for allocating livers, as well as endorsed more
uniform national standards for evaluating one's need for an organ and concomitant place on the wait list. In all,
despite the remaining disagreements,
it appears that the Final Rule takes a
necessary and flexible2 4 step toward a
more reasonable and equitable system
of organ allocation.
Daniel Luke Geyser
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Internet Pharmacies:
Regulation of a Growing
Industry
Industry analysts estimate that Internet pharmacies will generate $1.4 billion 1 in prescription drug sales by 2001
and over $15 billion by 2004.2 The
recent rush by traditional brick and
mortar pharmacies either to partner
with existing Internet pharmacies or to
create their own web counterparts illustrates the increasing importance of
business on the Internet. Last summer,
retail pharmacy giant CVS acquired the
Internet pharmacy soma.com and
changed its name to reflect the new
ownership.' Early this year, in another
key industry move, Walgreen's
launched an upgraded, full-service Internet pharmacy in order to compete
more successfully in the pharmacy industry.4 It is estimated that there are
currently over 400 businesses operating on the Internet that dispense prescription drugs.
As the number of Internet pharmacies has increased, so has the concern regarding the safety of prescription drugs dispensed over the Internet.
Many of these web sites prescribe prescription drugs without a valid prescription, dispense drugs of questionable quality and fail to inform patients
of possible side effects and interactions.
Additionally, customers have difficulty
knowing whether an Internet pharmacy is a legitimate operation.

How pharmacies operate on the
Internet
Despite the large number of Internet
pharmacies, they fall primarily into
four categories': online pharmacies

that are partners with traditional brick
and mortar pharmacies (such as
drugstore.com and Rite Aid); online
pharmacies that are themselves brick
and mortar pharmacies (such as
cvs.com); online pharmacies that operate solely on the Internet (such as
planetrx.com); and web sites, usually
based outside of the United States,
where consumers can order prescription drugs without a prescription (such
as viagra-global.com).
Each of these types of pharmacies
operates differently with regard to how
a patient seeks to have a prescription
filled. All require the patient to set up
a personal account by choosing a user
name and password. This account contains basic personal information such
as name, address and phone number,
primarily for the purpose of billing and
shipping. Only a few of the Internet
pharmacies require patients to complete any type of health questionnaire
detailing such relevant specifics as allergies, diagnosed illnesses and medical history.
Internet pharmacies offer the consumer several different options in filling their prescriptions. Initially, consumers can mail their prescription to
an address given on the web site. This
works the same way as mail order pharmacies that have existed for many
years. Some pharmacies require consumers to mail in their prescription, as
is the case with prescriptions for Schedule I narcotics filled on cvs.com. Second, patients can have their physician
phone, fax or mail the prescription to
the Internet pharmacy, just as they
would with their traditional neighborhood pharmacy. Third, patients can
enter their prescription information
directly into the web site themselves.
Depending on the particular Internet
pharmacy, the web site may contact the
physician to verify the prescription in
every case or only on an as-determined
basis. Fourth, patients can transfer
existing prescriptions to Internet pharmacies by directing their current pharmacy to do so or by providing the relevant information to the web site,
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which will then contact the pharmacy.
Fifth, each Internet pharmacy allows
consumers to obtain refills of prescriptions they have had previously filled
on the web. This requires the consumer to log in to their personal account and complete a simple form.
Finally, in the case of most internationally-based web sites, the consumer simply completes an order form and se6
lects the desired drug and quantity.
After the consumer transmits his
or her prescription to the Internet pharmacy using one of these methods, the
web site then ships the prescription
directly to the patient. Consumers who
use an Internet pharmacy with a brick
and mortar counterpart, such as
drugstore.com or cvs.com, can opt to
pick up their prescription at their
neighborhood pharmacy instead of
having it shipped. It usually takes one
to five business days to receive a prescription, depending on the shipping
option selected by the consumer. In
the case of internationally-based Internet pharmacies, it can take up to three
weeks for delivery.
Obviously the quality and effectiveness of the pharmacy varies quite
substantially from web site to web site.
Serious concern exists about the quality of the drugs dispensed over the Internet. Consumers face possible adverse side effects, potentially dangerous interactions, as well as harm from
contaminated, counterfeit or expired
drugs. This has resulted in the call from
consumer groups, the government and
others for regulation of the burgeoning industry.
Regulation of Internet pharmacies
The states have traditionally regulated
pharmacies and the dispensing of prescription drugs. State boards of pharmacy license both pharmacies and
pharmacists to practice in their state.
The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has traditionally regulated only
the drugs themselves, approving them
for use to treat various illnesses or conditions and ensuring their safety. In-

creasing growth of the Internet pharmacy industry as well as growing concern about the safety of drugs dispensed
over the Internet has prompted the
pharmacy industry, the federal government and several states to take action.
Industry self-regulation
The primary industry response to Internet pharmacy growth has come
from two sources, the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP)
and a newly formed broad-based coalition. The NABP was established in
1904 to "assist state licensing boards
in developing, implementing, and enforcing uniform standards to protect
the Public Health."'7 In the spring of
1999, the NABP established the Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites
(VIPPS) program in response to increasing public concern about the
safety of Internet pharmacies.
The VIPPS program establishes a
"Good Housekeeping" type seal of
approval that Internet pharmacies can
display on their home pages. The seal
provides a direct link to the NABP In
order to receive the seal "a pharmacy
must comply with the licensing and
inspection requirements of their state
and each state to which they dispense
pharmaceuticals. In addition, pharmacies displaying the VIPPS seal have
demonstrated to NABP compliance
with VIPPS criteria including patient
rights to privacy, authentication and
security of prescription orders, adherence to a recognized quality assurance
policy, and provision of meaningful
consultation between patients and
pharmacists." 8
To date, the NABP has certified
four Internet pharmacies: cvs.com,
drugstore.com, merck-medco.com and
planetrx.com. As many as thirty additional Internet pharmacies have applied
for VIPPS certification. It remains to
be seen what effect this will have on
the overall safety of drugs prescribed
over the Internet.
A new pharmacy industry coalition formed in 1999 in response to the

chaos created by the rapid growth of
pharmacies on the Internet. The coalition resulted from an Internet pharmacy summit held in Washington, D.C.
on November 9, 1999. The National
Association of Boards of Pharmacy
organized the summit after Bill
Razzouk, CEO of planetrx.com, made
a request for one during his testimony
before the House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
on July 30, 1999.2 Members of the
coalition come from federal and state
governments, consumer organizations,
medical groups and Internet pharmacies.' 0
The coalition has formulated four
primary goals: first, to form a task
force on technology to develop legislative and enforcement initiatives; second, to develop an aggressive consumer education plan; third, to create
Operation Safe Net in order to organize the industry and serve as an agency
to receive consumer complaints; and
fourth, to establish the proper relationships for patients and pharmacists at
Internet pharmacies." It is currently
unclear how the coalition's goals will
interact with recent actions taken by
state and federal governments.
Federal government regulation
The first action by the federal government came in July, 1999, when the
FDA added information to its web site
(fda.gov) in order to assist consumers
in safely purchasing drugs over the Internet. The web site answers consumer
questions such as: "Is it safe to buy
prescription or over-the-counter drugs
online? How can you tell if a Website
that sells medical products is legitimate? What should you do before you
buy medical products online?' 2 According to FDA Commissioner Jane
Henney, "[t]he development of the Internet has opened up many new options for consumers to purchase products more conveniently" but has also
"provided unscrupulous individuals
with immense new opportunities to
promote and sell prescription drugs
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unlawfully to unsuspecting patients."13
In order to deal with the growth
of internationally-based Internet pharmacies illegally selling prescription
drugs, the FDA has begun to issue
"cyber" warning letters transmitted
electronically to web sites the FDA has
identified as selling prescriptions that
may be illegal. The letters inform the
web site owners that they may be in
violation of U.S. laws that govern the
sales of prescription drugs and further
warn that United States Customs officials may detain and refuse entry to
future shipments from the web site. So
far one such web site has voluntarily
agreed to cease its illegal activities. 4
On December 28, 1999, President
Clinton escalated the response of the
federal government and announced a
program to protect patients who purchase prescription drugs over the Internet. The plan, accompanied by $10
million in new funds, would give the
FDA authority to investigate, identify
and prosecute web sites selling unapproved new drugs, counterfeit drugs,
or prescription drugs without a valid
prescription or those which fraudulently market drugs." The plan would
also certify all Internet pharmacies that
meet state and federal requirements,
much as the NABP's VIPPS program
already does. It also creates new civil
monetary penalties and gives the FDA
subpoena authority to build cases
against offenders, a power it now
lacks. 16 This proposal met with generally favorable but mixed reaction.
While some Internet pharmacies,
including
drugstore.com,
familymeds.com
and
healthcentral.com, welcome the proposal as a way to deal with "rogue"
web sites, the National Association of
Chain Drug Stores favors a more voluntary approach to regulation.17 Some
question also exists regarding the appropriateness of the FDA as the regulator of Internet pharmacies. Pharmacy
regulation has traditionally been the
prerogative of state boards of pharmacy and the FDA has no previous
experience regulating in this area.

Additionally, Congressman Thomas Bliley, Jr. (R-VA), Chairman of the
House Commerce Committee, criticized the President's plan to expand
FDA authority. 18 His committee would
have to approve any legislation expanding the authority of the FDA to
include Internet pharmacies. Bliley is
reluctant to have the federal government regulate an area traditionally controlled by the states. He is also hesitant to regulate the Internet when politicians in Washington, D.C. do not fully
understand its potential. 9
The United States Customs Service
also plays a role in the regulation of
Internet pharmacies. An increasingly
high number of illegal drugs enter the
United States via shipments from internationally-based online drugstores.
The U. S. Customs Service seized 4.5
times as many packages of prescription
drugs in 1999 as it did the year before.20
While some of the seized drugs had not
received approval for use in the United
States, most did not comply with FDA
labeling requirements or fell below federal quality standards. 2'
Consumers are purchasing increasing amounts of prescription drugs from
these international Internet pharmacies
because they offer much lower prices
than pharmacies in the United States.
For instance, drugquest.com advertises
that it offers customers prescription
drugs without a prescription at prices
of up to 60% less than the prices
charged in the United States. The reality of this claim varies greatly depending on the cost to the consumer in the
United States as well as the availability
and price offered by the foreign pharmacies through drugquest.com.22 The
high cost of prescription drugs in the
United States has prompted many individuals, especially those with chronic
illnesses who take multiple medications
on a daily basis, to seek alternate
sources for their medication.

State government regulation
States have also begun to regulate Internet pharmacies. Several state attor-

neys general, including those in Missouri, Michigan, Kansas and Illinois,
have taken legal action to prevent Internet pharmacies from filling prescriptions for citizens of their states. 23 Generally, the states allege that Internet
pharmacies have failed to register with
the appropriate authorities in order to
lawfully conduct business in their state
and fill prescriptions authored by physicians not licensed to practice medicine in their state. Some web sites have
voluntarily agreed not to sell prescription drugs to residents of certain states
after receiving warning letters. 24 Additionally, some state boards of pharmacy have issued reprimands to unli2
censed Internet pharmacies. 1
The Attorney General of Missouri,
Jeremiah "Jay" Nixon, successfully
obtained a permanent injunction
against pillbox.com, a Texas-based Internet pharmacy, preventing the company from selling prescription drugs to
Missouri residents. Pillbox.com sold
prescription drugs to Missouri customers without a state license. The injunction requires the defendants to pay a
fine of $15,000 to the state and reimburse all Missouri residents who purchased drugs on the site. Additionally,
pillbox.com must clearly display a notice on their web site indicating that
they cannot sell drugs to residents of
Missouri. Similar lawsuits have been
filed in Illinois by Attorney General Jim
Ryan
against
expressrx.net,
expresstoday.com, mdhealthline.com,
26
rxclinic.com and maleclinic.com.
These Internet pharmacies face up to
a $50,000 penalty for each violation
of the state's consumer fraud act.
In Michigan, Attorney General
Jennifer Granholm's office conducted
an investigation in which law enforcement officials posed as customers and
purchased prescriptions drugs, including controlled substances, online without a prescription. In some cases, the
officials posed as minors and people
with illnesses who would suffer dangerous side effects from the medication they obtained. As a result of the
investigation, the State of Michigan

The Journalof Law, Medicine & Ethics

initiated legal action against ten online
pharmacies. All of them agreed to stop
drugs to Michigan
selling prescription
27
residents.
Future of Internet pharmacy
regulation
With the large number of Internet pharmacies in operation and an increasingly
high number that illegally dispense prescription drugs, further action to regulate the industry seems certain. The
jurisdictional lines, however, are far
from clear. While the states have traditionally regulated pharmacies and the
dispensing of prescription drugs, the
federal government and the FDA have
justified concerns due to the global
nature of the Internet and the threats
to public health and safety. The pharmacy industry also has concerns about
how Internet pharmacies operate. Although the industry has adopted voluntary standards that may work for
legitimate businesses, self-regulation
will likely prove inadequate to control
illegal practices. Because Internet pharmacies are not confined to one particular jurisdiction, cooperation between
the states and federal government will
be required to effectively regulate the
industry and protect consumers. While
this cooperation may lead to the successful regulation of Internet pharmacies that operate from within the
United States, effective regulation of
foreign-based pharmacies seems both
difficult and unlikely.
Amy J. Oliver
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